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Abstract: 
 
Past research reveals a tension between children's preferences for egalitarianism and ingroup 
favoritism when distributing resources to others. Here we investigate how children's evaluations 
and expectations of others' behaviors compare. Four‐ to 10‐year‐old children viewed events 
where individuals from two different groups distributed resources to their own group, to the 
other group, or equally across groups. Groups were described within a context of intergroup 
competition over scarce resources. In the Evaluation condition, children were asked to evaluate 
which resource distribution actions were nicer. In the Expectation condition, children were asked 
to predict which events were more likely to occur. With age, children's evaluations and 
expectations of others' actions diverged: Children evaluated egalitarian actions as nicer yet 
expected others to behave in ways that benefit their own group. Thus, children's evaluations 
about the way human social actors should behave do not mirror their expectations concerning 
those individuals' actions. 
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Article: 
 
1. Introduction 
 
Children's reasoning about resource distribution highlights an emerging tension between the 
norms of egalitarianism and prioritization of one's own group (e.g., Fehr, Bernhard, & 
Rockenbach, 2008). Children, like adults, often believe it is fair to share equally with everyone, 
yet they sometimes prioritize the interests of their own group. In investigating the origins of 
human beliefs about fairness and resource distribution, past research has largely focused on 
children's own behaviors or evaluations of others' actions. We know less about children's 
expectations of how others will behave. The current paper investigates how children's 
expectations and evaluations of others' behaviors compare. If children believe that people should 
act in egalitarian ways, do they expect others to actually abide by those principles? Are children's 
beliefs about what should be compatible with their beliefs about what is? 
 
Young children demonstrate a preference for equal distributions of resources (Baumard, 
Mascaro, & Chevallier, 2012; Birch & Billman, 1986; Blake & McAuliffe, 2011; Damon, 1977; 
Gummerum, Hanoch, Keller, Parsons, & Hummel, 2010; Lane & Coon, 1972; Sutter, 2007), by 
as early as the second year of life (Geraci & Surian, 2011; Schmidt & Sommerville, 2011; 
Sloane, Baillargeon, & Premack, 2012). By age 3, children display emotional reactions when 
resources are distributed unequally (LoBue, Nishida, Chiong, DeLoache, & Haidt, 2011), and 
they share equally with preschool classmates after working collaboratively to obtain resources 
(Warneken, Lohse, Melis, & Tomasello, 2011). Children's preferences for equality and 
reciprocity also increase across development (Damon, 1977). As illustration, children reject 
situations that create inequalities between themselves and a peer; this rate of rejection increases 
from ages 4 to 8 (Blake & McAuliffe, 2011). Recent research also finds that children across ages 
endorse norms of equal sharing, yet older children (7–8‐year‐olds) are more likely than young 
children (3–4‐year‐olds) to actually engage in egalitarian sharing behavior (Smith, Blake, & 
Harris, 2013). 
 
Children's early‐developing preferences for equality depict an optimistic portrayal of human 
nature, yet in reality the social world does not always operate in egalitarian ways. Rather, when 
allocating resources themselves, adults and children often prioritize members of their own group 
(Bernhard, Fischbacher, & Fehr, 2006; Bigler, Jones, & Lobliner, 1997; Dunham, Baron, & 
Carey, 2011; Fehr et al., 2008; Goette, Huffman, & Meier, 2006; Tajfel, Billig, Bundy, & 
Flament, 1971). For example, the amount of resources that 6‐ to 12‐year‐old children donated to 
their classmates was positively correlated with how long participants had attended their school 
(Harbaugh & Krause, 2000). Children also direct targets to share more resources with family and 
friends than with strangers (Olson & Spelke, 2008). Moreover, when sharing with others results 
in children receiving fewer resources themselves, children are more willing to share with friends 
than with nonfriends or strangers (Moore, 2009). 
 
A tension, thus, is observed between concerns for fairness and group favoritism; several 
researchers have sought to explain this tension. Haidt and colleagues describe a system of 
morality comprised of five foundational principles, which may operate early in development; in 
this framework, concerns for both fairness and reciprocity and ingroup loyalty and favoritism are 
represented (Graham, Haidt, & Nosek, 2009; Haidt & Joseph, 2004; see Haidt & Kesebir, 2010; 
for a review). Killen and colleagues propose that children weigh considerations for fairness and 
justice in context with obligations that arise from social relationships or concerns for group 
identity and cohesion (e.g., Killen, Margie, & Sinno, 2006; Rutland, Killen, & Abrams, 2010; 
Smetana, Killen, & Turiel, 1991). One recent study by Fehr et al. (2008) directly tested the 
interaction between equality and group favoritism. Three‐ to 4‐year‐old children typically chose 
distributions that maximized their own winnings, whereas 7–8‐year‐old children were more 
willing to select egalitarian outcomes. With age, children were also more likely to provide more 
resources to children from their school than a different school. The authors propose that 
tendencies toward both egalitarianism and parochialism develop in parallel during the early 
school years. 
 
Given the contrast between children's allegiances to principles of fairness and group loyalty, how 
do children expect others to behave? Past literature has focused largely on children's own 
behaviors and judgments of others' actions; we know less about how children expect others to 
act. The current research investigates how children's expectations and evaluations compare. Do 
children expect people to act in egalitarian ways or to privilege the interests of their own group, 
and to what extent might children's expectations be informed by their beliefs about how others 
should behave? One possibility is that children's expectations and evaluations of others' actions 
will coincide. Though a tension may exist between children's preferences for egalitarianism and 
their ingroup favoritism, these competing influences may similarly guide their evaluations and 
expectations. For instance, in a situation in which children prefer egalitarian outcomes, they may 
use egalitarianism to guide both their evaluations and expectations of others' actions. Likewise, if 
a situation recruits reasoning about ingroup loyalty, such reasoning may apply for both children's 
evaluations and predictions of others' behaviors. Past research on children's resource distribution 
has not typically distinguished between expectations and evaluations in their design. As 
illustration, Olson and Spelke (2008) provide compelling evidence of the factors that contribute 
to children's beliefs about resource distribution. Participants were asked to act on behalf of a 
third‐party protagonist (a doll) to distribute resources. Children prioritized the doll's ingroup 
members when allocating resources, with the exception of trials in which children were given 
precisely enough resources for all. Given that children were asked to act on another's behalf, it is 
possible that thinking about both what the protagonist should do and what she would do 
contributed to children's responses. From this perspective, situational cues may contribute to 
children's patterns of resource distribution (e.g., divide across groups when there are enough 
resources for everyone, prioritize ingroup members when resources are scarce), and these 
principles could apply to children's evaluations and expectations alike. 
 
A second possibility is that children's evaluations and expectations might diverge. Although 
studies of children's expectations of others' actions are limited—and no research to date 
compares children's expectations and evaluations in a resource‐distribution context—a few 
studies provide initial evidence in favor of this hypothesis. Kalish and Shiverick (2004) 
presented children with vignettes in which explicit rules and an actor's preferences diverged (e.g., 
“Johnny likes to flimmer. The rule is not to flimmer”). Children were more likely to use the rule 
to predict what an actor “should do” than what he or she “would do,” consistent with the 
possibility that young children's evaluations and predictions of an individual's actions can 
dissociate. Nonetheless, children's evaluations of what an actor “would do” did not differ from 
chance. Furthermore, in this study rules and preferences were explicitly provided to children. It 
is an open question whether children's evaluations and expectations will diverge when children 
must determine what constitutes norms or preferences—and how they relate to one another—on 
their own. 
 
Research on moral reasoning provides further suggestions that children may consider different 
factors when evaluating versus predicting behavior. In a study of children's understanding of the 
magnitude of moral and conventional transgressions, Tisak and Turiel (1988) observed that 
school‐aged children differentiated between what an actor should and would do. When given a 
forced choice between a severe conventional violation and a minor moral violation, participants 
judged that others would choose a minor moral transgression, to avoid the social disapproval that 
would accompany the severe conventional transgression. Yet children nonetheless judged that 
others should choose a conventional transgression instead of a moral transgression, regardless of 
their relative magnitude, to avoid harming others. Relatedly, although preschool‐age children 
evaluate harmful actions as violating moral obligations and thus as forbidden (e.g., Rutland 
et al., 2010; Smetana, 1981), they also predict that people will engage in harmful actions in 
contexts of intergroup competition (Rhodes, 2012). Nonetheless, we know little of how 
children's expectations and evaluations compare in a single paradigm that does not involve moral 
harm. A more general understanding of how children's expectations and evaluations compare and 
develop is of interest when exploring the underlying principles and developmental contexts that 
shape social cognition, and resource distribution provides an interesting test case of how 
children's expectations and evaluations compare. 
 
The present study compares children's evaluations and expectations of others' resource 
distribution actions in situations where motivations for egalitarianism and group loyalty may 
conflict. We presented 4‐ to 10‐year‐old children with vignettes about two groups at school who 
compete over scarce resources, in which target individuals from each group distributed resources 
(cookies) to other individuals. In the Evaluation condition, children were asked to evaluate the 
targets who distributed resources. In the Expectation condition, children were shown the same 
events and were asked to judge which resource distribution scenarios were more likely to have 
occurred. Children in both conditions saw identical events in which no explicit rules about 
resource distribution were provided or violated, and we sought to test how children's 
expectations and evaluations of others' actions compared. 
 
2. Methods 
 
Four‐ to 10‐year‐old child participants viewed pairs of target individuals who distributed 
resources in different ways: Some targets distributed resources entirely to their own group, some 
distributed entirely to the other group, and some distributed equally across groups. Children were 
either asked to judge which of the two target resource distributors in each trial was “nicer” 
(Evaluation condition) or which of two distribution events “really happened” 
(Expectation condition). 
 
2.1. Participants 
 
Participants included 144 4‐ to 10‐year‐old children from the Chicago, Illinois, area (74 girls, 70 
boys; mean age = 84.4 months, range = 49.3–130.5 months; 53.5% White, 11.1% African 
American, 5.6% Hispanic, 11.8% Asian, 18.1% other/multiracial). Forty‐eight children were 4–
5‐year‐olds (26 girls, 22 boys), 48 were 6–7‐year‐olds (24 girls, 24 boys), and 48 were 8–10‐
year‐olds (24 girls, 24 boys); children in each age group were equally distributed across 
conditions.1 Overall, parents of participants were well educated: 87.2% reported their highest 
level of education as a bachelor's or post‐graduate degree, 4.2% associate degree/some college, 
1.7% high school, 6.9% other/no response. 
 
2.2. Materials 
 
A series of images depicted a group of cartoon children dressed in either green or orange 
clothing. An introductory story about the “Orange Group” and the “Green Group” described the 
two groups competing over scarce resources at school. The story emphasized within‐group 
cooperation and competition between groups for access to resources (see Appendix). 
 
Test trials (presented in pairs) depicted resource distribution events involving the two groups 
(see Fig. 1). Each image in a pair depicted six children from each group at the top of the image 
and one target (the resource distributor) at the bottom. Some or all of the children held a cookie 
that they reportedly received from the target. The target gave out the cookies in one of three 
possible ways: (a) Ingroup (entirely to the target's own group), (b) Outgroup (entirely to the 
target's outgroup), or (c) Equal (evenly across both groups). Each image depicted distributions of 
either 6 or 12 cookies. 
 
2.3. Procedure 
 
The experimenter first told children the introductory story about the two groups. Next, the 
experimenter placed two test trial images side‐by‐side in front of the child. Both images in the 
pair depicted a target resource distributor from the same group (Green or Orange). Each of the 
two images portrayed different possible resource distributions (i.e., Ingroup vs. Outgroup, 
Ingroup vs. Equal, Equal vs. Outgroup). During each trial, the experimenter verbalized the 
distribution events to supplement the static images (e.g., “this kid from the Orange Group gives 
his cookies to this kid, this kid, etc.”). Children were either asked to evaluate which of the two 
target resource distributors in each pair was “nicer” (Evaluation condition) or which of two 
resource distribution scenarios “really happened” (Expectation condition). 
 
2.4. Design 
 
Children were randomly assigned to either the Evaluation or Expectation condition (with the 
exception of 8–10‐year‐olds who participated in both conditions; for these participants, condition 
order was counterbalanced across subjects). The order in which groups were introduced (Orange 
or Green first) and the number of cookies presented in each scene (6 or 12) varied between 
subjects.2 All participants viewed all three paired comparisons (Ingroup vs. Outgroup, Ingroup 
vs. Equal, Equal vs. Outgroup). Each comparison was presented twice; thus, participants saw 6 
total trials. Trial order was counterbalanced across participants and the lateral position of images 
for each test trial was counterbalanced within participants. The group membership of the targets 
in each trial alternated between the Orange and Green Groups. 
 
2.5. Scoring 
 
In each pair of images, one image depicted relatively more resources distributed to ingroup 
members than the other image. For Ingroup versus Outgroup trials, the Ingroup image displayed 
more ingroup favoritism (see Fig. 1a, left); for Ingroup versus Equal trials, the Ingroup image 
displayed more ingroup favoritism (see Fig. 1b, left); for Equal versus Outgroup trials, the Equal 
image displayed more ingroup favoritism (see Fig. 1c, left). Responses in which children chose 
the image in the pair where the target gave more cookies to ingroup members were scored as 1 
(as in Fig. 1a–c, left), whereas responses in which children chose the image where the target 
gave more cookies to outgroup members were scored as 0 (as in Fig. 1a–c, right). Since there 
were two trials of each comparison type, possible scores for each trial type ranged from 0 
(maximum outgroup giving) to 2 (maximum ingroup giving). 
 
 
Figure 1. (a) Example image of an Ingroup (1 point) versus Outgroup (0 points) trial. (b) 
Example image of an Ingroup (1 point) versus Equal (0 points) trial. (c) Example image of an 
Equal (1 point) versus Outgroup (0 points) trial. 
 
3. Results 
 
Means for each trial type are presented as the probability that children selected the option in 
which targets gave more resources to ingroup members. Probabilities are accompanied by Wald 
95% Confidence Intervals (CIs); when the CI does not include .50 (the probability expected by 
chance), the obtained probability differs from the probability expected by chance (see Table 1). 
 
Table 1. Mean proportions and confidence intervals for children's responses to each trial type, 
divided by age group 
Evaluation Condition Overall 4–5 years 6–7 years 8–10 years 
Ingroup (1) versus Outgroup (0) .19 (.11, .27)* .40 (.26, .54) .15 (.05, .25)* .02 (‐.02, .06)* 
Ingroup (1) versus Equal (0) .14 (.07, .22)* .38 (.25, .51) .04 (‐.01, .10)* .00 (.00, .00)* 
Equal (1) versus Outgroup (0) .71 (.62, .81)* .60 (.46, .74) .73 (.60, .85)* .81 (.70, .92)* 
Expectation Condition Overall 4–5 years 6–7 years 8–10 years 
Ingroup (1) versus Outgroup (0) .71 (.62, .80)* .57 (.42, .71) .69 (.56, .71)* .88 (.78, .97)* 
Ingroup (1) versus Equal (0) .61 (.51, .70)* .41 (.27, .56) .58 (.44, .72) .81 (.70, .92)* 
Equal (1) versus Outgroup (0) .69 (.60, .78)* .57 (.42, .71) .73 (.60, .85)* .77 (.65, .89)* 
Notes: Points allotted for each selection (e.g., Ingroup vs. Outgroup) are noted in parentheses. 
Proportions that are significantly different from chance (95% Wald Confidence Interval does not 
contain .50) are marked with an asterisk. 
 
To compare results across conditions, children's scores were modeled using a generalized linear 
model for each comparison type, with a binomial probability distribution and a logit link 
function (since participants made a binary choice for each trial). Condition 
(Evaluation vs. Expectation) was entered as a categorical variable; Age (in months) was entered 
as a continuous variable. Analyses tested for main effects of each variable and an interaction, and 
yield Wald Chi‐Square values as indicators of significant effects. To facilitate comparisons with 
past research (e.g., Dunham et al., 2011; Rhodes, 2012), Cohen's d values are reported as a 
measure of effect size. 
 
Although some studies have found effects of gender and birth order on children's judgments 
about fairness (e.g., Fehr et al., 2008), preliminary analyses did not reveal any effects of either 
factor. Therefore, the following analyses collapse across gender and birth order. 
 
3.1. Ingroup versus Outgroup trials 
 
When children were presented with a choice between targets who gave all their resources to their 
own group and targets who gave all their resources to their outgroup, children expected targets to 
favor their ingroup (Expectation condition: MIngroup = .71, CI = .62, .80) but evaluated favoring 
the outgroup as “nicer” (Evaluation condition: MIngroup = .19, CI = .11, .27; main effect of 
Condition, Wald χ2(1) = 16.4, p < .001, d = 0.68). This pattern became increasingly divergent 
with age (Condition × Age interaction, Wald χ2(1) = 29.8, p < .001, d = .93; Fig. 2, top); Age 
was negatively correlated with selecting ingroup scenarios in 
the Evaluation condition, r = −.48, p < .001, but positively correlated with selecting ingroup 
scenarios in the Expectation condition, r = .36, p = .002. Selections of ingroup scenarios also 
declined with age overall (main effect of Age, Wald χ2(1) = 4.19, p = .04, d = .55). Thus, for 
these items, children's expectations and evaluations diverged. 
 
 
Figure 2. Results for the Evaluation and Expectation conditions by trial type and age (in years). 
 
3.2. Ingroup versus Equal trials 
 
When children saw a contrast between targets who gave all their resources to their own group 
and targets who distributed resources evenly across both groups, children again expected targets 
to provide more resources to ingroup members (Expectation condition: MIngroup = .61, CI = .51, 
.70) yet evaluated egalitarian distributions as “nicer” (Evaluation condition: MIngroup = .14, 
CI = .07, .22; main effect of Condition, Wald χ2(1) = 20.1, p < .001, d = 0.76). Children's 
responses diverged with age (Condition × Age interaction, Wald χ2(1) = 28.8, p < .001, d = .91); 
again, Age was negatively correlated with selections that depicted ingroup favoritism in the 
Evaluation condition, r = −.42, p = .003, but was positively correlated in the Expectation 
condition, r = .41, p < .001 (see Fig. 2, center). Overall, children's selections of ingroup scenarios 
declined with Age (main effect of Age, Wald χ2(1) = 5.43, p = .02, d = .66). As above, children 
positively evaluated individuals who exhibited less ingroup favoritism and distributed cookies to 
both groups, yet they expected others to prioritize their own group. 
 
3.3. Equal versus Outgroup trials 
 
When children viewed a contrast between targets who gave their resources equally to both 
groups and those who distributed all their resources to the outgroup, we find similar results 
across conditions: Children expected targets to distribute cookies equally across groups and also 
evaluated them as “nicer” (Expectation: MEqual = .69, CI = .60, .78; Evaluation: MEqual = .71, 
CI = .62, .81). In both conditions, the extent to which children endorsed equal distributions also 
increased with age (Evaluation: r = .26, p = .025; Expectation: r = .22, p = .066; main effect of 
Age, Wald χ2(1) = 12.0, p < .001, d = .36). Here, children's responses converged across 
conditions, suggesting that children view it as nice and also more likely for individuals to give 
equally (rather than prioritizing the outgroup; see Fig. 2, bottom). 
 
3.4. Control conditions 
 
While children's evaluations and expectations appear to be diverging with age, it is also possible 
that our youngest sample of children did not understand the task presented. To test younger 
children's comprehension of the scenario outside of a resource distribution context, we presented 
a separate group of 24 4‐ and 5‐year‐olds with the same stimuli and asked them to make 
predictions about who an individual from a particular group would most likely befriend 
(the Friendship condition). Children heard the same introductory story about intragroup 
cooperation and intergroup competition and viewed the same stimuli described above with two 
exceptions: (a) All cookies were removed from the images and (b) instead of displaying a target 
child at the bottom of each picture (see Fig. 1), children were shown one target child from either 
the Orange Group or the Green Group. Children were asked which image in each pair (Ingroup 
vs. Outgroup; Ingroup vs. Equal; Equal vs. Outgroup) depicted the target child's friends. As in 
the first study, children saw six trials (two of each contrast). We collapsed across trial types to 
calculate the overall probability that 4–5‐year‐olds would select ingroup‐favoring scenarios as 
the most likely depictions of friendship. Children were more likely to select the image depicting 
comparatively more ingroup members than would be expected by chance 
(MIngroup = .68, CI = .60, .76). Children were also more likely to select ingroup‐favoring scenarios 
in the Friendship condition than in either the Expectation or Evaluation conditions. A binomial 
logistic regression model revealed a significant effect of Condition when comparing 
the Friendship condition to the Expectation condition (Wald χ2(1) = 8.00, p = .005, d = .84) and 
the Evaluation condition (Wald χ2(1) = 14.3, p < .001, d = 1.10). These results suggest that the 
youngest children were not unable to comprehend the introductory story, understand the 
requirements of this task, or make systematic predictions. Instead, their specific expectations and 
evaluations of resource distribution events in the context of intergroup competition appear to 
change with age. 
 
Another potential limitation of the current study is that “nice” is a general descriptor that could 
refer broadly to the character of the individuals, their desirability as potential friends, or to the 
quality of a single action. “Nice” may also be highly socially constructed: Children may be 
taught at home or at school that it is “nice” to share with everyone. To assess whether the results 
in the Evaluation condition generalize beyond evaluations of who is “nice,” we tested a separate 
group of 72 4‐ to 10‐year‐olds in a second Evaluation condition with the same materials, 
procedure, and design but a different test prompt: Who “did the right thing?” This question was 
selected in light of past research asking children to assess whether an action was “right” or “all 
right” versus “not all right” and notes children using “right” and “wrong” in their own moral 
judgments (e.g., Killen, Mulvey, Richardson, Jampol, & Woodward, 2011; Kohlberg, 
1963/2008; Piaget, 1932/1997). Re‐computing the analyses presented above to compare children 
tested in the Expectation condition with those tested in the second Evaluation condition (“right”), 
we again observed children's expectations and evaluations diverged with age. Analyses revealed 
the same patterns of results as reported above: For Ingroup versus Outgroup and Ingroup versus 
Equal trials, we found a significant effect of Condition (Ingroup vs. Outgroup: 
χ2(1) = 13.7, p < .001, d = 0.63; Ingroup vs. Equal: χ2(1) = 11.3, p = .001, d = 0.57) and a 
Condition by Age interaction (χ2(1) = 26.8, p < .001, d = 0.88; χ2(1) = 22.3, p < .001, d = 0.81). 
For Equal versus Outgroup trials, we found only a significant effect of Age, 
χ2(1) = 9.61, p = .002, d = 0.37. Thus, the observation that children's expectations and 
evaluations diverge with age generalizes to broader evaluative contexts. 
 
4. Discussion 
 
These findings provide evidence that children's expectations and evaluations of others' behaviors 
diverge in the context of competition over scarce resources. Though all children viewed the same 
events of individuals from competing groups distributing resources to members of their ingroup, 
their outgroup, or equally to both groups, children's responses across conditions differed 
dramatically. Participants assigned to the Evaluation condition expressed a preference for 
egalitarianism. When asked which resource distributor was “nicer,” children chose the one who 
shared across groups. These evaluations were markedly different from children's responses in 
the Expectation condition. When asked which event “really happened,” children predicted that 
resource distributors would favor their own group. These data provide evidence that although 
children express a clear intuition that it is nicer to be egalitarian, they do not think that this is 
how people actually behave in competitive situations. As one child commented, “people don't do 
that for real.” 
 
This finding of a divergence in children's expectations and evaluations of others' actions is of 
particular interest given how compelling the counter‐hypothesis was: Namely, that children's 
expectations of others actions might harness beliefs about what the actors should do, or vice‐
versa. Moreover, although past research has revealed a tension between children's preferences for 
egalitarianism and their ingroup favoritism, it seemed plausible to reason that these competing 
influences might have similar consequences for both evaluations and for expectations. For 
instance, in a situation in which children prefer egalitarian outcomes, they may use 
egalitarianism to guide both their evaluations and expectations of others' actions, and situations 
that recruit reasoning about ingroup loyalty might do so for both children's evaluations and 
predictions of others' behaviors. In contrast, the current findings provide clear evidence that 
children's evaluations and expectations do not uniformly operate in parallel, and they may recruit 
different underlying principles and evidence. 
 
We also observed that divergences in children's responses across 
the Expectation and Evaluation conditions increased with age: From ages 4–10, children's stated 
preferences for egalitarianism and their expectations that others would not behave in egalitarian 
ways increased. Open questions concern the mechanism underlying the observed developmental 
trajectory, and whether children's reasoning about evaluations and expectations necessarily 
follow an analogous developmental time course. Interestingly, children's reasoning in a 
potentially related domain follows a similar developmental trajectory. Children's skepticism 
about others' statements of self‐promotion seems to undergo a similar transition between the ages 
of 4 and 10; older children are more likely than younger children to consider another's self‐
interested motives and acknowledge the possibility that others might lie or engage in self‐
aggrandizing reporting of valued traits (Heyman, Fu, & Lee, 2007; Mills & Keil, 2005). Children 
tested by Heyman et al. (2007) were increasingly likely with age to suggest that others might 
exaggerate the extent to which they possess highly valued traits (e.g., honesty, intelligence, 
niceness) which may confer important social benefits, but they did not expect the same inflation 
for traits that seemed unlikely to elevate an individual's social standing (e.g., color preferences). 
With age, children may develop a more complex view of others' actions and motivations, in 
which they acknowledge actors' actions can harness intentions that are not necessarily “pure.” 
Nonetheless, it is also important to note that in the current design, our task may be best suited to 
assess the views of older children, and perhaps more sophisticated experimental methods would 
reveal divergences between children's expectations and evaluations at even earlier ages. 
Although our control Friendship condition with 4‐ and 5‐year‐olds suggests that children of this 
age are generally capable of reasoning about the implications of group membership when tested 
on a very similar task, thinking about resource distribution may be more demanding. Methods 
that provide younger children with firsthand experience receiving resources or collaborating with 
others to obtain resources have proven successful with children as young as 3 years of age 
(Baumard et al., 2012; LoBue et al., 2011; Warneken et al., 2011) and could contribute to 
profitable future research. 
 
Several additional open questions result from these findings. First, future research might 
investigate whether the compositions or identities of the groups in competition might influence 
children's inferences about resource distribution. What if instead of groups at school, the 
presented groups were formed on the basis of gender, language, or community lines? What if one 
group constituted a numerical majority or was higher in social status? It seems conceivable that 
children's expectations of others' actions within and across group lines may differ depending on 
the social identities of the groups. Some types of groups (e.g., those formed based on language or 
gender; Kinzler, Shutts, DeJesus, & Spelke, 2009; Rhodes & Gelman, 2009) may be more salient 
to young children than others. Likewise, children may have asymmetric expectations about how 
individuals who are high or low in prestige may interact (Henrich & Gil‐White, 2001). The 
scenarios described to children tested here were explicitly about intergroup competition; children 
may draw similar conclusions about naturally occurring groups without explicit mention of 
competition, yet the possibility remains that these findings are unique to situations of 
competition over scarce resources. 
 
Second, we might investigate the impact of children's own group membership on their reasoning 
about others' distribution of resources. In this study, children were third‐party observers of the 
events depicted. How might children's evaluations change if they became members of either the 
Orange or Green Group? It is possible that children's evaluations might appeal to concerns for 
group loyalty, rather than to egalitarianism, if children were members of one of the presented 
groups (e.g., Graham et al., 2009; Haidt & Joseph, 2004; Haidt & Kesebir, 2010; Olson & 
Spelke, 2008). If members of one of the groups themselves, children might positively evaluate 
individuals who distribute more resources to ingroup members and also expect group members 
to act in ways that demonstrate their loyalty to the group. 
 
Finally, critical open questions concern how differences in cultural context might impact the 
pattern of results presented here. We tested children living in a major, urban, largely politically 
liberal city in the United States. How might children living in diverse areas of the United States 
or other countries compare to the children tested here? Research with adults suggests that 
adherence to norms of ingroup loyalty differs based on cultural and political context (Graham 
et al., 2009), and that a variety of demographic factors (e.g., community size, economic and 
religious participation) influence adults' and children's behavior in economics games (Henrich 
et al., 2010; Henrich, Heine, & Norenzayan, 2010; Rochat et al., 2009). The origins and 
development of children's divergent evaluations and expectations for egalitarian versus ingroup‐
serving actions might similarly be a case where cross‐cultural research would be fruitful. 
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Notes 
1. The same 8–10‐year‐old children participated in both conditions. Condition order was 
counterbalanced across participants. 
2. We included two options for number of resources (6 vs. 12 cookies) to consider the 
possibility that children might only exhibit ingroup favoritism in situations of scarcity 
(see Moore, 2009). However, children's selections did not reliably differ based on the 
total number of cookies they saw, so analyses collapsed across number of cookies. 
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Appendix 
 
Full text of introductory script: 
 
Here is the Green Group. They are a group of kids who all like the same games, all play together, 
help each other out and are all friends. They all like to wear green, and they call themselves the 
Green Group. 
 
Here is the Orange Group. They are a different group of kids who all like the same games, all 
play together, help each other out and are all friends. They all like to wear orange, and they call 
themselves the Orange Group. 
 
The Green Group and the Orange Group are always competing to get the best things. 
 
On the playground, there aren't enough of the best games to go around. Here, there aren't enough 
swings for everyone, and the Green Group and the Orange Group both want to play on them. 
 
At recess, the Green Group and Orange Group always compete against each other. They always 
want their team to win the game. 
 
At story time, there aren't enough of the best seats for everyone. Everyone wants to sit in a fun 
chair, but there aren't enough for everyone in the Green Group and the Orange Group. 
 
In the classroom, they always want their own group to line up first. The Green Group and 
Orange Group both want to be the best group at school! 
 
Now, we're going to meet some more kids from the Green group and Orange group, who can 
give out cookies to the other kids. 
 
 
